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POINT I
THIS CASE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW,
THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT
The facts
the isbUH

-

conclusion of
r

iftri | IJ t a I

f the case are not contradicted

Where

, una COUI t --ows '"> deference to the
n

- -rr^l

'w '

ourt.

. :sj

01 we 11

?d

Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scot Company,
;

Inc« , 603

**

•"

*

s case, a de

novo review cf trie issues is appropriate.
POINT 11
ROBERT WRIGHT PAID FOR AND DESERVED
COMPENSATION UNBER HIS POLICY WITH BEAR RIVER
i"" "t""1" i Wright
tempting to -^\

(hereafter

"Wrigbr

^oiiiething for nothing in

-

had paid for uninsured motorist benefits
covered Wrighi

*"••••

tranue

assume*; * n%- t ,?v

Those benefits

on

it.

knew the motorcycle did

Bear Rivler argues that Wright

Howeverf during oral argument, 'hi:- |>J < t

of the Wright deposition w^s discusser.
edge. '•

, *

111 11 i >-,. ant omot i i 1 H

Bear River argues WrigM
•(-T

vi> "

i • •-

Beat: River acknowl-

• -m. '"'insurance" generally

and "uninsured motorist protection
The L'jur;' : Mt . *-u 1 1 \ *^n is correct, you
weren't talking <a:< n*
linsured motorist
coverage,
you
wen 1
ta Iking
about

•1

insurance coverage. To the extent there
is a difference, you acknowledge that?
Mr. Duffin:

Yes.

(P.15, hearing transcript attached hereto as Appendix "A".)
Wright does not contend the liability portion of
the auto policy extends to the bike.

The liability policy

is very different from the uninsured policy.

The two are

different in statutory requirements, intent and risk exposure.

Wright had paid for

uninsured motorist insurance at

the time of this accident.

This protection covered Wright -

not his property.

Wright is not asking for any coverage he

has not paid for.
POINT III
THE UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE IS REMEDIAL
IN NATURE. IT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
TOWARD MEETING THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
The intent of the uninsured motorist statute is
clear.

That is to put the injured policy holder in the same

position he would be in if the tort-feasor had liability
insurance.

North River Ins. Co. v. Kowaleski, 551 P.2d 1286

(Or. 1976).

This intent is obvious from reading the statute

itself.
for the protection of persons
insured
thereunder who are
legally
entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting therefrom.
[Emphasis added.]
Section 41-12-21.1, U.C.A., as amended, 1983.
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Insurance companies have routinely

attempted

to

narrow the coverage required by uninsured motorist statutes.
Courts have just as routinely invalidated such exclusions.
See Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah
1981); Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co./ 621 P.2d 702
(Utah 1980); and Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231
(Utah 1985).
In Brown v. United Service Automobile Association/
684 P.2d

1195

(Okla. 1984) the insured was injured by a

hit-and-run

driver.

vehicle was

later identified.

vehicle was not.
of

hit-and-run

The

innocent

owner

of

the

guilty

The driver of the guilty

The subject policy included a definition
driver

not

found

in

the

statute.

definition would deny coverage under the facts.

This

The court

invalidated the restrictive definition/ finding:
. . . provisions and definitions which
purport to condition, limit or dilute
the provisions of the uninsured motorist
statute are void and unenforceable.
(Citations omitted.)
See also Kau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 564 P.2d 443 (Hawaii 1977) exclusion limiting uninsured
motorist protection to injuries sustained while occupying
owned motor vehicle held void; Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
592

P. 2d

445

(Kansas

1979) exclusion

limiting

uninsured

motorist coverage to hit-and-run accidents involving "contact" held void; Hartford
Dairyland
limiting

Accident and

Ins. Co., 545 P.2d
uninsured

motorist

113

Indemnity Co. v.

(Oregon 1975) exclusion

coverage

to

accidents

where

vehicle occupied by insured is drivern by person in excess
of 25 years held void.
In Barnett v. Crosby, 612 P.2d 1250 (Kansas 1980)
(attached as Appendix
identical exclusion
insured

had

"B"),

the court was faced with the

as in the subject case.

affirmatively

rejected

protection on his motorcycle.

There, the

uninsured

motorist

Reviewing the Kansas unin-

sured motorist statute, the court said:
The offer of uninsured motorist coverage
to policyholders is mandatory under
40-284. Furthermore, any provisions of
the insurance policy which purport to
condition, limit or dilute the unqualified uninsured motorist coverage mandated by the statute are void and unenforceable.
Van
Hoozer
v.
Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 219 Kan. 595, 607,
549 P.2d 1354 (1976); Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640,
Syl. 1, 512 Pj2d 507 (1973) .
•

*

*

*

Therefore, since the mandatory uninsured
motorist statute (K.S.A. 40-284) requires protection of the insured wherever he may be (Midwest Mututal), it is
apparent that the AID exclusion clause
is an attempt to dilute this mandated
coverage and consequently is void.
The fact that Barnett rejected the
extension of uninsured motorist coverage
in his motorcycle policy with Midwest
Mutual Insurance Company does not change
the liability of AID under its uninsured
motorist provision.
Barnett paid an
additional premium to insure himself
against the eventuality of colliding
with an uninsured motorist and should
receive the benefits for which he paid.
A clear majoirty of courts having dealt with this
issue have voided the subject exclusion.

4

Like Kansas, the Utah uninsured motorist statute
follows the person, not the insured vehicle.

The Utah law

requires coverage whenever the insured is hurt at the hands
of an uninsured driver.
coverage are invalid.

Exclusions otherwise limiting this

See also 20 A.L.R.4d 1069.

Since the Utah statute is remedial in nature, it
should

be

construed

broadly

toward

affording

coverage.

Simpson v. Farmers Insurance Co., 592 p.2d 445 (Kan. 1979).
POINT IV
THE BASIS FOR THE EXCLUSION
IS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE
Bear River has repeatedly argued that Wright would
be

"cheating" the insurance company if the exclusion is

voided.

Bear River's argument is founded in the rationale

that uninsured

motorist

coverage

extends

vehicle instead of the insured persoft.
patently incorrect.

to

the

insured

That rationale is

The express wording of the law provides

coverage to the person, not the vehicle.

The intent of the

law is to put the injured insured in the position he would
be in if the tort-feasor had liability coverage.
Since

uninsured

motorist

coverage

follows

the

person, not the vehicle, the exclusion has no significant
connection to the risk involved.
that have examined this
rejected it.

Ttie majority of courts

"Business Interest" argument have

Elledqe v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.Ct.App.

1972); Jacobson v.

Implement

Dealers

5

Ins.f

640 P.2d

908

(Mont. 1982); State Farm Mututal Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel,
488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971); Nyqaurd v. State Farm Mutual Ins.
Co./ 221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn 1974); and Calvert v. Farmers Ins.
Co. of Arizona, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985).
There is no difference between this exclusion and
one voiding coverage while the insured is in a non-owned
automobile.

Logically, the insured has paid no premium on

either vehicle.

Thus, the insured would be "cheating" the

insurance carrier in either instance.

In fact, the logic

behind the subject exclusion could easily be extended to
limit uninsured motorist coverage to the insured automobile
only,

that is clearly not the intent of the legislature.
If

the

Legislature

chooses

to

limit

the

Utah

statute it may do so. The Legislature had included such an
exclusion within the Utah no-fault law at the time of this
accident.

See

amended 1973.
the

uninsured

§31-41-10(a)(i),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

as

The absence of this specific exclusion within
statute

evidences

a

clear

intent

by

the

legislature to afford coverage under these facts.
POINT V
THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE SHOULD NOT
BE REDUCED BY EARLIER PAID BENEFITS
Bear River's policy includes a provision for the
reduction of uninsured motorist benefits.

This provision

reduces benefits for all sums otherwise paid by or on behalf
of the owner or operator of the vehicle.

6

(See Part IV -

Limits of Liability" of said policy as attached to Bear
River's brief.)
The Utah
no-fault benefits.

no-fault

law provides

for

set-off

to

(See §31-41-7, Utah Code Annotated, as

amended 1973.)
The Utah Uninsured Motorist statute does not allow
for any reduction of benefits.

(See 41-12-21.1, Utah Code

Annotated, as amended 1967.)

If the legislature intended

uninsured motorist benefits to be reduced by other benefits
paid out, appropriate language would bp included within the
law.
Bear

River's

set-off

provision

is

yet

another

attempt to reduce the minimum coverage called for by Utah
law.

This Court has already held such reductions inappro-

priate.

Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co., 621 P.2d 702

(Utah 1980).
The rationale of Thamert was that such a reduction
was

not

authorized

by

statute.

Such

a reduction

would

result in benefits below the minimum coverage called for by
Utah

law.

This

explanation

is

forceful

in effect.

If

reduction of benefits is allowed, uninsured motorist coverage will be erased in many instances.
The court

in Bradley

v. Mid-Century

N.W.2d 141 (Mich 1980) said:
Unless voluntarily purchased uninsured
motorist coverage provides meaningful
protection for severe, above-threshold,
injuries without regard tfo what the
insurer is required to pay under the

7

Ins., 294

mandatory no-fault coverage, it serves
no apparent purpose in the context of a
no-fault statute mandating the payment
of benefits.
If the set-off were
enforced in the manner the insurers
seek, no-fault benefits
paid would
reduce
uninsured
motorist
coverage
dollar for dollar.
As soon as the
insurer has paid out $20,000 in no-fault
benefits, there would be no recovery
whatsoever under the uninsured motorist
endorsement.
The
insured
could be
entitled to collect substantial non-economic damages from the uninsured motorist but would, by reason of the set-off
receive nothing from the insurer.
If the set-off of no-fault benefits
were to be enforced in the manner the
insurers seek, it would mean that the
uninsured motorist, endorsement, designed to secure recovery
from an
uninsured motorist, would provide no
recovery in those cases where the
injuries are most severe because the
severity of the injuries maximized the
no-fault benefits for work loss or
medical expenses.
See also Newton v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. , 594 P.2d 1042 (Colo, 1979); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 549 P.2d 1354 (Kan, 1976);
Bear

River's

argument

concerning

the

set-off

provision is similar to that voiced by Justice Hall in his
dissenting opinion in the Thamert opinion.

Wright respect-

fully disagrees with Justice Hall's position in that case.
The language of the uninsured motorist statute is plain,
unambiguous and mandatory in effect.

If Wright chooses to

purchase the uninsured motorist coverage, that policy must
meet

the minimum

subject

coverage

"reduction"

clause

called
gives

for by Utah
Bear River

law.

the

The

premium

dollar of Wright without affording the protection called for

8

by Utah law.
uninsured

The carrier collects separate premiums for

motorist

coverage

and

no-fault

coverage.

carrier might then erase the uninsured motorist

The

coverage

through the set-off provision of the policy.

The result,

the

non-economic

insured

is

left

uncompensated

for

all

damages suffered and often for certain economic injury not
paid by the no-fault coverage.
The rationale

of Thamert

Should

be upheld

and

applied in this case.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act was created to
set forth the minimum motor vehicle insurance coverage that
might be sold in this state.

Insurance companies have, and

will continue, to come up with exclusionary language which
cuts into the basic insurance coverage required by Utah law.
The exclusion voiding uninsured motorist coverage
for an owned uninsured automobile must be held to violate
the statute and public policy.

So too should the policy

clause calling for reduction of benefits otherwise paid to
the injured party.
J;
/'RhW

^

Respectfully

submitted

this

A

day

of

, 1987
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for AppeVlarM:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH)
* * *

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ROBERT J. WRIGHT, and
MARK MARTINEZ,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JU[DGEfS RULING
Cikil No. C85-7999
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
September 22, 1986

>

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, a Judge oF the Third Judicial District Court of
the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on the 22nd day of September, 1986, at
2:30 p.m., and that the following proceedings were had.
* * *

Bunny Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

For the Defendant Wright:

Thomas A.
SPAFFORD,
JENSEN
311 South
Salt Lake

Duffin
DIBB, DUFFIN &
State, Suite 380
City, Utah 84111

G. Steven Sullivan
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES
965 East 4800 South
Suite No. 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
* * *

P R O C E E D I N G S
September 22, 1986
2:30 p.,m.
THE COURT;

We are in session in the matter of

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company versus Robert J. Wright
and Mark Martinez, Civil No. C85-79$9.

There are

reciprocal motions for summary judgment before the Court.
And there has been a motion to publish the deposition of
Robert J. Wright that was filed with this Court.

I assume

there is no objection.
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

No objection.

Gentlemen, will you make your

appearances, for the record?
MR. SULLIVAN:

Steven Sullivan for the Defendant

Robert Wright.
MR. DUFFIN:

Thomas A. Duf^in for the Plaintiff

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company!.
MR. SULLIVAN:

There are three, Your Honor, issues

involved in today's argument.

Those consist of whether or

not the subject exclusion works to excuse the uninsured
motorist coverage applicable under the facts.

The second

issue, if there is coverage whether^ or not the setoff
limitation would apply to limit the uninsured motorist
coverage.

And the third issue is whether or not the

arbitration clause of the contract binds the parties to
3

such arbitration.
Looking first to the coverage issue, Your Honor,
that issue has been quite well briefed by both parties.
really boils down to two simple arguments.

It

First is

whether or not the Utah statutes allows for limitations, or
exclusions to otherwise limit the minimum coverage set out
in that statute.

Your Honor, the uninsured motorist

statute is found at Section 41-12-21.1. And it's quite
broadly worded.

There are really only two requirements for

coverage here.

First is that an insured person is injured,

suffers sickness or disease at the hands of an uninsured
motorist.

And that's it.

That's the amount of the

statute.
Like I say, it's very broadly worded.
think it's worded in such a way for a purpose.

And we
And that

is, it's simply designed to take the place of liability
coverage on the part of the uninsured driver.

Therefore,

any injuries suffered by the insured which would be covered
by that uninsured driver would be covered under this
uninsured coverage statute.
As discussed in the memorandum, Your Honor, there
have been several attempts by other insurance companies to
place limitations and exclusions on the uninsured motorist
coverage.

For instance, Farmers Exchange versus Call.

In

that case, it involves an exclusion based on the household,

or members of the household exclusion to limit liability
coverage.

The Utah court rejected that limitation, and in

fact indicated that the statute holds no exclusions to the
minimum coverage.

Therefore, there pan be no exclusion.

Very broad indication that the Court does not want to limit
the minimum coverage set out in these statutes.
Also, there is the case of |Fhambert versus
Continental Casualty Company.

That earned a setoff

limitation under the Workman's Compensation.

And again,

the Utah Court said there was no such exclusion in the
statute.

Therefore, we are not goinig to hold that

limitation as active.

If the Court does find that

limitations, or exclusions may be rqad in Utah, we believe
the present exclusion is inappropriate.
The Plaintiff has argued that the number of motor
vehicles owned by the insured is thq basis for not allowing
coverage in this situation.

In othqr words, there is a

business interest argument here.

That is, Plaintiff, or

the Defendant insured has not paid a premium for the risk;
therefore should not be covered for that risk.
The case law in this area is very clear that there
is no such connection.

And in fact, in Elledge versus

Warren, 2 63 South 2d 912, the Court there said, "An
insurance company may not create irrational and illusory
'business interest' and interpose them as a bar to

5

comprehensive coverage required by uninsured motorist
statute."
Later, the Court notes the rate is simply not
related to the risk.

The statute as worded is clearly

aimed at covering a person, and not the vehicle covered by
that policy.

Therefore, the uninsured motorist coverage

would apply whether or not the insured was walking, riding
on a bicycle, riding on a skateboard, or traveling by a
pogo stick.

It's a very broad, almost accident policy

rather than simply limited to risk.
We also bring up a Federal District Court case,
Scow versus Farmers Exchange, that was a Utah District
Court decision interpreted by Utah law.
decisis affecting that holding.
there is some weight to it.

There is no stare

But at the same time,

As noted in our later

memoranda, even if the exclusion is upheld, we believe the
exclusion is not applicable under these particular facts.
The exclusion is aimed at uninsured automobiles.
No where in the policy is owned automobiles defined to
include motorcycles.

And in fact in the PIP section of the

policy, it indicates motorcycles are specifically exempted
from the "motor vehicle".
We feel A, the policy is very clear in not
including motorcycles in this exclusion.

And if the Court

is not so aggrieved by the policy, at least the policy is

ambiguous, and should be construed in favor of the insured.

Looking at setoff, very similar arguments apply.
Setoff limitations is simply a limitation not called for
under the policy.

The Court in Fhambert versus

Continental, 621 Pacific 2d 702, Utah 1980, uses similar
rationale to that of Scow in finding there is no exclusion
for setoff in the statute.

Therefore, the exclusion is not

applicable.
Finally, Your Honor, as to the issue of
arbitration, we earlier discussed the case of Barnhart.
Further research has unfortunately ^ed us to find Lindon
City versus Engineer Construction Company, 63 6 Pacific 2d
1070, a Utah case, 1981. A brief reading of that case
makes us believe the Court has probably overruled Barnhart.
And we would withdraw our objection to the arbitration at
this time.
THE COURT:

It has.

MR. SULLIVAN:
MR. DUFFIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Can we all agree that the Supreme

Court has not ruled on this particular question that we now
have before the Court today?

Probably they will get an

opportunity to rule on it in reference to it, and so that
being the case, I think it is important in reference to the
issue.

Now, I think the issue we hfrve here based upon the

facts, and I've read them into the record, and it's in the
deposition, first of all this man had seven motorcycles.
He had one 1950 Ford LTD which he paid about a $70 premium.
He had seven motorcycles he had available.
He said some of them weren't being used on the
road, but some of them were.

He did have seven motorcycles

available with one insured vehicle.

He said in his

deposition he did not tell his agent anything about that.
The question was asked him on the insurance of
motorcycles.

I asked him, why didn't you ever tell your

agent you were the owner of motorcycles?
to have these insured?

He said, "No.

towards insuring the motorcycles.
it was not required by law.

Did you ever ask

I had no thoughts

My entire thinking was

Therefore, I elected to go

with the risk of driving them.
So what he did was he deliberately assumed the
risk of seven motorcycles.
required to be insured.
motorcycles were not.

And he said that they weren't

I knew automobiles were;
Therefore, I elected to assume—he

said in his own words, "I decided that I would assume the
risk.

And he did until he went to a law office and they

decided that rather than proceed against the tort feasor in
this case, they would proceed against the insured's
insurance company.
So we have the situation with seven motorcycles
8

deliberately knowing that they weren't insured,
deliberately not procuring insurance.

I think, and I'll

bring the issue very quickly, I think the issue is stated
in the ALR citation*

I will agree with opposing counsel

there is a split of authority.
the issue is as follows:

But as the ALR citation,

Does public policy—that's what

every one of them come down to—the policy is clear that we
do not insure any vehicle owned by insureds furnished for
his regular use for which premium is paid.

And the ALR

citation which you're going to be called on to decide is
simply as follows:

Does public policy require insurance

protection for uninsured vehicle—in this case for seven
additional vehicles—owned by the insured which are not
listed on his policy for which he paid no premium?
the issue.

That's

Does the uninsured motorist protection require

an insurance company to furnish uninsured motorist
protection for one to seven vehicles not listed on his
policy for which he paid no premium?

That's what the ALR

citation said.
The landmark case, which they issued in that case
there was from Maine.
thinking.

Arizona has gone along with the same

There has been as many go along.

And then I'll

go see what our Court has said, and then this Court can
then make the decision.

The Maine ALR citation which is

the landmark for that, as it said irt Maine, because Bracket

9

was insured while riding an uninsured motorcycle owned by
him, Section 2902 does not compel Middlesex to extend
coverage for his injuries.
We recently states that uninsured motorist
coverage owned by an insured does not extend the benefits
of such coverage for no premium to all other vehicles owned
by the insured.

Theoretically, a man could be a car

collector, and he could have 25 automobiles that he was
providing for regular use for his family, provide one
policy, and pick up uninsured motorist on 25 vehicles.
The question of the Supreme Court's we'll have to
review eventually, and probably in this case.
we had seven.

In this case

We could have 25.

Now, let's go through and find out what our
Supreme Court in about two sentences has said.

The Call

case, the first one that came up, and I don't dispute it,
and I'm not going to talk about the subtraction from the
policy, I'm not going to raise the question of the
deduction from the policy for PIP benefits paid, he's
probably got the better end of the argument on that.
think he has.

I

But the question of whether there is

coverage or not is addressed to us in Farmers Exchange
versus Call, which came down December of last year.

And in

that case, they upheld, and said that was just entirely
commensurate with, in conformance with, and in agreement
10

with the guest statute.

When they abolished the guest

statute, the household agreement was obviously invalid.
Justice Durham said the purpose of t^he uninsured motorist
protection is this legislative action reflects a public
policy requiring minimum coverage to protect innocent
victims of automobile accidents.
The question is, our Supreme Court has said the
uninsured motorist protection is to protect innocent
victims of automobile accidents.

Is a person who

deliberately decides that he's not cooing to buy any
insurance on seven motorcycles—is he an innocent victim to
collect on injuries for which he did not pay any premium?
The public policy I think is clear.

I think that

it is not to protect a person—now, there may be a question
on pit benefits, because under PIP benefits, hospitals and
other people are, but in this case, it allows this person
to collect insurance as though the cither party was insured.
And in this case, he therefore wants insurance on a vehicle
for which he paid no premium.
If it appeals to anyone's $ense of justice, by all
means let him adopt it.

It doesn't appeal to mine.

I

think the landmark case here, which is the Osuala case was
where the person had no insurance.
difference in this case.

I don't see any

I don't ki)ow whether I'm

pronouncing it correctly—probably turn out to be the
11

1

Court's case some time ago.

2

THE COURT:

3

4

I

MR. DUFFIN:
case.

No.
No.

It wasn't mine.
I don't think it was the Court's

But in the Osuala case, the person in the very same

5 J case as this doesn't buy any insurance.

And when he got

6

through, he said I'm an innocent victim.

7

to collect on the other guy's insurance, because the person

8

I ran into, the person that caused the accident had

9

insurance.

10
11

I should be able

So I ought to be able to collect on his PIP

coverage.
And the Supreme Court said this in the Osuala

12

case, and I think between the Call case on the purpose, and

13

the Osuala reasoning is the thinking which our Supreme

14

Court has given the guidelines, and the guidelines which I

15

think this Court should follow.

16

case, which I've given to the Court on page 243, in regard

17

to the Plaintiff's urgency that the no

18

substitute uninsured motorist h e r e — i n regard to the

19

Plaintiff's urgence that the no fault law is intended to

20

provide coverage for others who might be injured as a

21

result of an automobile accident, it is pertinent to

22

observe that he himself has not met that requirement,

23

because he was driving without insurance.

24

aspect of the act is the requirement that the PIP

25

protections for an injured motorist are to be paid by his

And they say in the Osuala

fault—let's

An

important

12

own insurer.

To permit the Plaintiff to violate the act,

and nevertheless insist upon compensation from the other
motorist's insurer, regardless of fault, would reward him
for his wrong, and would tend to defeat the purposes of the
act.
Isn't that where we really are in this case?
Wouldn't it be the very purpose to defeat the act to allow
a person again to, who knows about it, who doesn't intend
to do it, who freely admits in his deposition, I did it
intentionally, I just assumed the risk, to come into Court
with seven motorcycles, and say I don't buy it on that, I
get insurance on every one of those seven vehicles, and
it's all free, and the company ought to pay for it.
Anyone—if it appeals by anyone's sense of justice, by all
means adopt it.

I don't believe under this circumstance—I

don't believe the Supreme Court will uphold this .situation.
And I think it's proper, and apparently they are also
willing to stipulate on the question of arbitration.
So I think we've got a single issue here that can
very well be ruled on by the Supreme Court.

And I think

they will follow the reasoning of the Call case, and the
Osuala case when they say it's for the protection .of
innocent people.
He is not that.

And I thijqk that under those

circumstances, I think he should not be given the benefit
13

of that protection.
THE COURT:

I submit it, Your Honor.
Mr. Duffin, do you agree that there

are no questions of fact, and this matter should be decided
as a matter of law at this time?
MR. DUFFIN:
THE COURT:

I agree.
Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

May I make one

quick comment?
THE COURT:

Let me ask you the same question, as

long as we're here on that.

I detected some dispute in the

memorandum regarding whether or not the statements of fact
were in fact accurate.
MR. SULLIVAN:

Is there a dispute of fact here?
Your Honor, there was a civil

dispute as to the term insurance in the deposition as used
by Plaintiff in the memorandum.
part of the transcript.

It set forth a certain

And then from that excerpt, an

attempt to indicate that my client had no intention of
having insurance coverage, and I brought that up in my
latest memorandum simply to indicate that we are really
talking about uninsured coverage here, not the vague term
insurance.
THE COURT:

It appeared to me that the exchange

between Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Duffin, and the
claimed insured here, the Defendant Mr. Wright, deals with
insurance generally.

Do you agree with that?
14

1

MR. DUFFIN:

2

THE COURTS

3

MR* DUFFIN:

Dealt with what?
Insurance generally.
In other words k

4

this motorcycle?

5

purchase insurance on this motorcycle?

6

risk.

7

That's right,

THE COURT:

u

MR. DUFFIN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SULLIVAN:

!4 I

THE COURT:

18

To the extent there is a

difference, you acknowledge that?

10

17

I just assumed the

Mr. Sullivan is correct; you weren't

9 J about insurance coverage.

16

I s^id, Why didn't you

talking about uninsured motorist coverage, you were talking

8

15

insurance coverage on

Yes.
Is that the o n l ^ issue you took up?
That is the only issue.

Otherwise, I assume with that

J modification you would agree at this point in time there
are no questions of fact?
MR. SULLIVAN:

I agree.

The only point I would

| raise is Mr. Duffin's astute use of policy for defeating

19

the uninsured motorist in this situation.

As the Court

20

noted in the Lindon City case in overturning B a m h a r t , the

21

Court noted that public policy is th^t set forth by the

22 | legislature.
23

If the legislature intended that public policy

24

should mean not to include motorcycles within the uninsured

25

motorist coverage, it would be simple enough to exclude

15

that.

Looking at the liability portion of the Utah statute

on auto coverage, the legislature has in fact specified
exclusions or limitations to that minimum coverage.
Again, obviously the legislature has the ability
to add those exclusions, have done so in the past.
did not do so here.

They

Their clear intent is to provide broad

coverage.
Looking at the Osuala case, again if I pronounce
that incorrectly, I'm sorry, there the claimant was not
depending on any statutory basis.

The claimant was simply

looking to the no fault, and readily admitting the claimant
had no insurance, but was intending to hook onto the
Plaintiff's insurance simply through the basis of logic,
and not through any statutory requirement.

With that, I

would submit it.
THE COURT:

Mr. Duffin, anything further?

MR. DUFFIN:

I could just say one thing.

I think

we have the same thing—maybe I'm trying to simplify it too
much, but I buy one vehicle, I have six other vehicles with
one policy, I can't see how the Supreme Court is going to
rule that the person gets coverage on those other six
vehicles he owns, which are for his use.
been the law.

That has never

That has never been part of the insurance

coverage.
This concept of where we are now, and if a man
16

buys insurance, the statute says the insured automobile,
and any other automobiles not owned fry him, not furnished
for his regular use.

But if a man can buy one insurance

policy for $70, like he did in this case on an old klunker,
and have Cadillacs, and 15 other cars for his use, and get
PIT benefits on uninsured motorist, to me we're gone.
There is no hope.

And he's not an innocent victim when he

does that.
Now, I can even see payment on PIT benefits,
because some ofthe companies are paying the PIT benefits,
just period, if there is a question.

But certainly the man

is not—who is attempting to recover under uninsured
motorist shouldn't be able to do that for his own
liability, because he's not an innocfent victim at that
time.

A third person might, but he's not.
THE COURT:

there is no hope.

I don't know as I'd go so far to say

I don't think Western Civilization turns

on this decision here today.
issue, gentlemen.
some interest.
today.

I submit it.

But it is a very interesting

I read the cases that you submitted with

I think I'm prepared to rule on the issue

I particularly read with some interest the Coates

case, and see if I can glean any direction from that that
might apply to uninsured motorist coverage.

And the more I

read it, the more I became convinced that I could not.

The

record is such that if the Coates case just says you get no
17

fault benefits regardless of what automobiles, or what
vehicles you tell the insurance company you've got then
they apply to no fault, and I can understand the reasoning
behind it.

But I don't think it follows that the same is

true with uninsured motorist coverage that can be excluded
under our law.

And while it automatically attaches unless

someone suggests they don't want it, that doesn't mean—
that's different than no fault.
So I don't think Coates is applicable, and
certainly not dispositive of this case.
I think it's clear if you want uninsured motorist
coverage, you better buy it.

You better pay the premium.

I guess what it boils down to in the case that's indicated
as the head case in the ALR annotation convinced me most of
its soundness.

So the motion for summary judgment on that

issue sought by Bear River Mutual Company is granted, and
the motion of Mr. Wright as a defendant is denied.

And

that makes the question of setoff and arbitration moot
anyway.

Put it in that format, and let the Supreme Court

take a look at it.

Mr. Duffin, will you prepare an order

reflecting the Court's decision on summary judgment?
I'll return your copy of the deposition.

And

I have the

original in the file.
(The hearing is concluded at
this time.)
* * *
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After reading all of the statutes above in pend a convicted juvenile's license dp to one
pari materia {Brown v. Keill 224 Kan, 195, year and we hold that the district court's
Syl. 14, 580 P«2d 867 [1978]), it is our opin- order of suspension was within its Statutory
ion that the only traffic offenses which are jurisdiction.
not subject to the provisions of K.S.A.1979
Affirmed.
Supp. 8-2117 are those specifically excepted
under K.SA.1979 Supp. 38-802(e).
[1] The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that the purpose and intent
of the legislature governs when that intent
can be ascertained from the statute. Wachholz v. Wachholz, 4 Kan.App.2d 161, 162,
603 P.2d 647 (1979). The legislature obviously intended for the great majority of
traffic offenses committed by older juveniles to be dealt with expeditiously and
fairly without involving the juvenile courts.
The justification for such a statutory
scheme is apparent Most traffic offenses
involve a relatively minor degree of criminal culpability and are generally susceptible
to a prompt and reasonably accurate disposition. The offenses specifically excepted
from the statutory scheme, i. e., K.S-A. 8 262 (driving without a valid driver's
license), KJS.A. 8-287 (driving while considered a habitual violator), K.SA. 8-1566
(reckless driving), K.S.A. 8-1568 (fleeing or
attempting to elude police officer), K.S.A.
21-3405 (vehicular homicide), and K.SA.
1979 Supp. 8-1567 (driving while intoxicated), are generally more serious crimes. In
the case of such a serious offense, the legislature intended that the full panoply of
rights and procedures normally instituted in
juvenile matters be afforded the accused
minor.

i
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Pat BARNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Peggy CROSBY, Defendant,
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AID Insurance Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 50721.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
June 27, 1980.
Review Denied Sept. ^, 1980.

Insured brought action igainst his insurer and against uninsured motorist to recover for injuries sustained when car driven
by uninsured motorist struck motorcycle insured was riding. The Ford District Court,
Robert M. Baker, J., granted summary
[2] In the instant case defendant was judgment and dismissed insurer as a deconvicted of driving left of center (K.S.A. fendant and returned judgment against un8-1514). Such offense is obviously a "stat- insured motorist, and injured appealed.
ute relating to the regulation of traffic on The Court of Appeals, Paries, J., held that:
the roads, highways or streets" and is not (1) uninsured motorist provision of policy
specifically excepted under K.S.A.1979 covering insured's automobile excluding inSupp. 38-802(e). The district court was juries arising as a result of occupying a
thus granted jurisdiction of the matter pur- vehicle other than the insured vehicle which
suant to K.S.A.1979 Supp. 38-815 and K.S. was owned by insured wis an attempt to
A.1979 Supp. 8-2117. The latter statute dilute coverage mandated by statute and
expressly allows the district court to sus-
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consequently was void, and fact that insured rejected extension of uninsured motorist coverage on his motorcycle policy
with insurer did not change insurer's liability, and (2) insurer was not bound by damages awarded in judgment against uninsured motorist
Reversed and remanded.

1. Insurance *»467.51(2)
Any provisions of insurance policy
which purport to condition, limit or dilute
unqualified uninsured motorist coverage
mandated by statute are void and unenforceable. K.SJL 40-284.
2. Insurance <*=>467.51(3)
Uninsured motorist coverage protects
named insured wherever he may be, whether in described vehicle, another "owned"
vehicle, a nonowned vehicle or on foot
K.S.A. 40-284.
3. Insurance *»467.51(3)
Uninsured motorist provision of policy
covering insured's automobile which excluded injuries arising as a result of occupying a
vehicle other than the insured automobile
owned by insured was an attempt to dilute
coverage mandated by statute and consequently was void and fact that insured rejected extension of uninsured motorist coverage in his motorcycle policy with insurer
did not change liability of insurer under
such provision. K.S.A. 40-284.

Syllabus by the Court
1. Insurance provisions which purport
to condition, limit or dilute the unqualified
uninsured motorist coverage mandated by
the statute are void and unenforceable.
2. Uninsured motorist coverage protects the named insured wherever he may
be, whether in the described vehicle, another "owned" vehicle, a non-owned vehicle or
on foot
8. A provision excluding uninsured
motorist coverage for injuries arising as a
result of occupying a vehicle (other than the
insured vehicle) which is owned by the
named insured is a void attempt to dilute
the coverage mandated by statute.
4. When summary judgment was erroneously granted to a defendant insurance
company, the company will not be bound on
remand of the case by the judgment rendered against its codefendant

Donald E. Shultz, of Shultz, Shultz &
Tedford, P. A., Dodge City, for plaintiff-appellant
B. G. Larson, of Williams, Larson, Voss
Strobel & Estes, Dodge City, for defendantappellee AID Ins. Co.
Before SPENCER, P. J., and ABBOTT
and PARKS, JJ.
PARKS, Judge:

4. Judgment *»704
Uninsured motorist insurer, which was
granted summary judgment in insurer's
personal injury action against it and codefendant, an uninsured motorist, was not
bound by damages awarded in judgment
rendered against codefendant
5. Judgment *=>668(1), 678(1)
With respect to persons in whose favor
or against whom doctrine of res judicata is
applicable, a former adjudication is binding
only on parties in proceedings in which it is
rendered and their privies.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff Pat
Barnett from an order granting summary
judgment to the defendant AID Insurance
Company on an uninsured motorist claim.
The facts are not in dispute. On March
7, 1977, plaintiff was injured when a car
driven by defendant Peggy Crosby struck
the motorcycle Barnett was riding. Neither Crosby nor her car were insured. Barnett's motorcycle and his family car were
both insured—the car by AID and the motorcycle by Midwest Mutual Insurance
Company—but only the policy carried by

1252 Kan.
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AID on the car included uninsured motorist
coverage.
Barnett brought suit against both Crosby
and AID, seeking judgment in excess of
$10,000, AID moved for summary judgment claiming that it had no duty to defend
or to pay any judgment because: (1) its
policy only provided liability coverage for
Barnett's car, and (2) the uninsured motorist coverage excluded injuries arising as a
result of occupying a vehicle (other than the
insured vehicle) which is owned by the
named insured. The trial court upheld the
policy exclusion, granted summary judgment and dismissed AID as a defendant
The court then discharged the jury, received plaintiffs offer of proof and stipulation, and returned a judgment against Crosby for the amount of damages agreed to by
Barnett and Crosby. Plaintiff now appeals
the trial court's ruling upholding the validity and application of the uninsured motorist
coverage exclusion.

Therefore, since the mandatory uninsured
motorist statute (K.S.A. 40-284) requires
protection of the insured wherever he may
be (Midwest Mutual), it is apparent that
the AID exclusion clause is an attempt to
dilute this mandated coverage and consequently is void.
The fact that Barnett rejected the extension of uninsured motorist coverage in his
motorcycle policy with Midwest Mutual Insurance Company does not change the liability of AID under its uninsured motorist
provision. Barnett paid an additional premium to insure himself against the eventuality of colliding with an uninsured motorist
and should receive the benefits for which he
paid. While it is true that Barnett could
have stacked coverage to avoid sustaining
damages in excess of the limits of a single
policy (Van Hoozer v. Farmer^ Insurance
Exchange, 219 Kan. at 608, 549| P.2d 1354),
he chose, as was his right, to avail himself
of the protection he had purchased from
AID_

[1] The offer of uninsured motorist covIn view of the Midwest Mutual decision,
erage to policyholders is mandatory under
K.S.A. 40-284. Furthermore, any provi- we conclude that the trial court erred in
sions of the insurance policy which purport granting summary judgment in favor of
to condition, limit-or dilute the unqualified AID. Accordingly, this case must be reuninsured motorist coverage mandated by versed.
the statute are void and unenforceable.
[4] The final issue relates to whether
Van Hoozer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 219 Kan. 595, 607, 549 P.2d 1354 AID is bound by the damages awarded in
(1976); Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty the judgment against its co-defendant, PegCo., 212 Kan. 640, Syl. 11, 512 P.2d 507 gy Crosby. We hold that AID is not bound
by that judgment.
(1973).
[2,3] The exclusion relied on by AID
has been considered previously. Forrester
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
213 Kan. 442, 517 ?2i 173 (1973); Midwest
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 3 Kan.
App^d 630, 599 P.2d 1021 (1979), rev. denied 227 Kan.
(March 14, 1980). In
Midwest Mutual it was held:
"Uninsured motorist coverage protects
the named insured wherever he may be,
whether in the described vehicle, another
'owned' vehicle, a non-owned vehicle, or
on foot" Midwest Mutual, Syl. H 3, 599
P.2dl022.

[5] The summary judgment granted
AID had the effect of releasing it from any
further responsibility to defend the lawsuit.
The fact that AID's counsel remained in the
courtroom does not mean that AID was or
could have been involved in the subsequent
proceedings against Crosby. (?nce summary judgment was granted, All) was neither
a privy nor a party to the judgment against
Crosby. With respect to persdns in whose
favor or against whom the doctrine of res
judicata is applicable, a former adjudication
is binding only on parties in the proceedings
in which it is rendered and their privies.
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Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482,488,449 P.2d
536 (1969).
The conclusion that AID should not be
bound by the prior determination of liability is also supported by Clayton, 212 Kan. at
652, 512 PJ2d 507. There the principal defendant defaulted while the insurance company, Alliance, sought time to prepare legal
argument concerning its contractual liability. The trial court excused Alliance from
the default hearing and stated that the
ruling on liability was limited to the co-defendant, Bedore. The trial court entered
judgment against Bedore and held that Alliance was bound by the previous determination of damages. The Supreme Court
reversed and held that Alliance was not
collaterally estopped from challenging the
damage judgment. The reason for not imposing collateral estoppel in this case is
even greater because AID was granted
judgment before any determination of liability was made and would have no cause to
defend the suit further.
We reverse and remand this case to the
district court for trial on the issue of liability of AID Insurance Company.

KEYftUMB£RSYSTtM>

drilled, brought suit to recover value of the
supplies on theory that a lien followed such
-merchandise. The Cowley District Court,
Robert L Bishop, A. J., granted judgment
for seller for value of tubing, but denied
recovery for the lengths of rod, and seller
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Abbott,
J., held that seller did not obtain lien, pursuant to oil field supply lien statute, for the
lengths of rod where they were not actually
used in digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing, operating or repairing of the well.
Affirmed.

Mines and Minerals «=» 112(3)
Lien could not be obtained, pursuant to
oil field supply lien statute, for lengths of
rod sold and delivered to leasehold owner
for use in a oil and gas well being drilled
where such material was not actually used
in digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing,
operating or repairing the well. K.S.A. 55207.
Syllabus by the Court

In order to obtain a lien pursuant to
K.S.A. 55-207 for material sold to the leasehold owner and delivered to the leasehold,
the material must be actually used in the
digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing,
operating or repairing of any oil and gas
well for which the material was furnished.

5 Kan.App.2d 101

FENDER PIPE & SUPPLY,
INC., Appellant,
v.

Don JENKINS and Ed Broyles,
Appellees.
No. 50898.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
June 27, 1980.

Seller of tubing and lengths of rod for
use in oil and gas well, which was being

Robert L. Earnest, Russell, for appellant
No appearance by appellee.
Before ABBOTT, P. J., and SWINEHART and MEYER, JJ.
ABBOTT, Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a lien under K.S.A. 55-207 for 88
lengths of '/Wnch rod that plaintiff stipulated was delivered to the well site but not
used.

